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The Historical Relation between Banking, Insurance and Economic 
Growth in Sweden: 1830 to 1998 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine empirically the dynamic historical relation between banking, insurance 
economic (income) growth in Sweden using time-series data from 1830 to 1998. We 
examine long-run historical trends in the data using econometric tests for 
cointegration and Granger causality. Our results indicate that the development of 
domestic banking, but not insurance, preceded economic growth in Sweden during the 
nineteenth century, while Granger causality was reversed in the twentieth century. We 
also find that the development of bank lending in the nineteenth century increased the 
demand for insurance as well as promoting economic growth. In later periods, the 
development of insurance fosters demand for banking services but only in times of 
economic prosperity. For the entire period of our analysis, we find that banking is the 
predominant influence on both economic growth and the demand for insurance. In 
contrast, the insurance market appears to be driven more by the pace of growth in the 
economy rather than leading economic development. Therefore, we conclude that 
financial intermediation, particularly banking, is an important prerequisite for 
stimulating economic growth and argue that our results could have important policy 
implications for contemporary emerging economies that are developing their financial 
and legal infrastructures. 
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The Historical Relation between Banking, Insurance and Economic 
Growth in Sweden: 1830 to 1998 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we examine the dynamic historical relation between banking, 
insurance and economic (income) growth in Sweden using time-series data from 1830 
to 1998.  We believe that this is a particularly apt topic for research given that banks 
and insurance companies have historically played an important role in economic 
development as a result of their financial intermediary activities. For example, 
economic historians with an interest in both banking (e.g., Nygren, 1983; Jonung, 
1992; Hansson and Jonung, 1997) and insurance markets (e.g., Pearson, 1992, 1993; 
Smith and Stutzer, 1995) have consistently reported that financial intermediation 
assisted economic development in the early years of mass industrialization in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by, amongst other things, mitigating risk and 
uncertainty, encouraging entrepreneurship, accumulating productive capital, and 
fostering the development of the national financial infrastructure. Outreville (1990, 
1996), Arestis and Demetriades (1997), Adams and Zou (2004) amongst others, argue 
that, for similar reasons, there is likely to be a strong linkage between banking, 
insurance and economic growth in today’s emerging economies. However, not many 
previous empirical studies have focused on the role played by financial intermediation 
(especially insurance) in the historical development of modern economies (e.g., see 
Sylla, 2002, 2003). Additionally, researchers (e.g., Pagano, 1983; Rousseau and Sylla, 
2005; Sylla 2002, 2003) suggest that the conjoint effects of banking and other 
financial systems (like insurance) in relation to historical patterns of economic growth 
is not clear from the literature. Therefore, we believe that econometric work on the 
historical development of the financial services sector and its implications for the 
wider economy could usefully inform economic historians as well as industry 
regulators, legislators, and others with a contemporary policy interest in financial 
services, and its role in international economic development. For example, empirical 
studies, such as ours, can help to promote a better understanding of how financial 
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services facilitate risk-taking and entrepreneurship in developing economies. 
Furthermore, a country-specific approach (such as that adopted in the present study) 
helps to avoid the potentially confounding effects, such as differences in culture and 
regulatory environments that can arise in prior cross-country financial services-
economic growth-based studies (e.g., see Ward and Zurbruegg, 2000)1. 
 Hansson and Jonung (1997), Wachtel and Rousseau (1995), Rousseau and 
Wachtel (1998), Ward and Zurbruegg (2000), amongst others, have pointed out that 
economic growth can be either supply-led as a result of development in financial 
intermediaries like banks and insurance companies, or alternatively, economic growth 
can promote the public demand for financial services. In fact, the question of whether 
the financial services sector preceded or followed economic growth has for a long 
time been debated in the economic history literature on Scandinavia (e.g., see 
Sandberg, 1978, 1979; Nygren, 1983; Hansson and Jonung, 1997; Schön, 1988, 1995) 
and other parts of the world such as the United Kingdom (UK) (e.g., see Pearson, 
1992, 1993) and the United States (US) (e.g. see Rousseau and Sylla, 2005). 
However, in the financial economics literature, where studies have tended to been 
conducted on a cross-sectional country basis using short time-series data (typically 
less than 30 years), there is no clear empirical evidence on the direction of the causal 
relation between the development of banking and insurance markets and economic 
growth (e.g., see Outreville, 1990, p. 491 and Ward and Zurbruegg, 2000, p. 490). 
This study thus contributes to the literature by shedding light on the empirical linkage 
between banking and insurance separately and conjointly on Swedish economic 
growth over the 159 years from 1830-1998 – a period covering the early years of 
mass industrialization to the present day2.  
We contend that Sweden is a potentially interesting domain in which to focus 
of our study not only because of the country’s rich economic archives, but for other 
reasons too. For example, take the insurance industry: unlike UK and US-based 
insurance companies, which have invested heavily in equity markets since the 1920s 
(Scott, 2002), Swedish insurers have (due primarily to regulatory constraints) only 
                                                 
1 This attribute does not necessarily mean that our results do not have wider appeal. For example, our 
results could be generalized to the financial services sector of countries that have experienced a similar 
economic history and institutional legal-regulatory framework to Sweden – for example, other 
Scandinavian countries. 
2 Gårdlund (1947) suggests that the early 1830s mark the approximate beginning of Sweden’s modern 
industrialization period. The 1830s also witnessed greater monetary stability (e.g., through the 
establishment of a silver standard currency) and the formation of the first commercial banks.  
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been active purchasers of equities since the late 1970s/early 1980s (Lindmark, 
Andersson and Adams, 2005). Indeed, Waldenström (2002) reports that high taxes on 
equity transactions during the first half of the twentieth century effectively ‘crowded 
out’ trading on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. In the post-1945 period, Swedish 
insurance companies were required by the Insurance Act 1948 to adopt a 
precautionary asset management strategy and work in partnership with government in 
the public management of the economy (Lindmark et al., 2005). This situation could 
have affected the financial intermediation function of insurance in Sweden during 
much of the twentieth century - for example, in terms of reducing the efficient 
allocation of capital in the economy, and thus restricting economic growth. Therefore, 
the historical relation between insurance and economic growth in Sweden could take 
on a different profile from that of other less regulated insurance markets such as the 
UK and US. This could potentially provide important insights as to the nature of the 
empirical relation between financial intermediation and economic growth in 
environments subject to different levels of regulation, particularly over time. 
Our results suggest that banking, but not insurance, was an important 
prerequisite for stimulating economic growth in Sweden during the nineteenth 
century. Subsequently, improvements in economic growth increased the public 
demand for financial services (including insurance) as the economy matured over 
time. We also find that the development of bank lending in the nineteenth century 
increased the demand for insurance as well as promoting economic growth. In later 
periods, we find that the development of insurance fosters demand for banking 
services but only in times of economic growth. For the entire period of our analysis, 
we find that banking is the predominant influence on both economic growth and the 
demand for insurance. In contrast, the insurance market appears to be driven more by 
the pace of growth in the economy rather than leading economic development. These 
results have potentially important policymaking implications for State planners, 
legislators and regulators seeking to develop local financial systems as a prelude to 
implementing and supporting future strategies for economic development. Clearly, 
this issue is also important for policymakers in contemporary emerging economies 
and analysts at international economic organizations such as the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides 
background information on the historical development of the Swedish banking and 
insurance markets, while section 3 examines the theoretical linkages between 
banking, insurance and economic growth, and derives six hypotheses to guide 
empirical testing. Section 4 describes research methodology, including the sources of 
data, econometric specifications employed and measurement of our variables. Section 
5 discusses our empirical results, while section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Development of the Swedish Banking and Insurance Markets  
 
In 2004 there were 22 banks operating in Sweden employing nearly 40,000 
people. Total assets at December 2004 were valued at roughly SKr 2,390 billion (US$ 
360 billion) with approximately 86% of new loans being issued by joint-stock 
companies, 10% by foreign-owned banks and 3% by mutual forms of organization 
(SCB Statistiska Centralbyrån, 2005). In comparison, the Swedish insurance industry 
comprises about 440 (life and property-liability) companies. In 2003 these companies 
generated total annual premiums of approximately SKr144billion (US$21 billion) 
(split roughly between life and non-life on a 2:1 ratio) and held assets valued at 
roughly Skr1607 billion (US$ 235 billion) (split roughly between life and non-life on 
a 9:1 ratio). The insurance industry also directly employs nearly 20,000 people in 
Sweden (Swedish Insurance Federation, 2004). According to Larsson (1991) the 
national insurance market emerged in Sweden in the second-half of the nineteenth 
century with the formation of Skandia (a joint-stock composite insurance company 
established 1855)3. Indeed, the growth of the Swedish insurance market in the second 
half of the nineteenth century is contemporaneous with the development of a national 
network of private (sometimes mutual) savings banks and commercial joint-stock 
banks that also performed an important financial intermediation role in promoting 
rapid industrialization and economic development alongside the Swedish Central 
Bank (Sveriges Riksbank) (Sandberg, 1978). The second-half of the nineteenth 
century witnessed other financial developments, such as the increase in savings, rise 
of commercial credit (including mortgage) facilities by Swedish banks, the emergence 
                                                 
3 However, some local fire and marine insurance companies in Sweden can trace their origins back to 
the eighteenth century. For example, the present day Stockholm Fire Insurance Office 
(Brandförsäkringskontor) was founded in 1746. 
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of financial markets (like the Swedish bond market) and increased levels of foreign 
bank trading (Nygren, 1983).  The Riksbank played a direct role in the management 
of the national financial system during the nineteenth century to ensure, amongst 
other things, adequate liquidity, bank solvency, and control of the national debt and 
money supply4. The Riksbank’s central supervisory function was supported through 
standardized banking rules and regulatory inspections of banks (Jonung, 1992). 
Insurance company regulations were also introduced in Sweden from the 1880s with 
the passing of national (solvency-based) insurance laws in 1886 and 1903 (Lindmark 
et al. 2005). However, in contrast to some other emerging insurance markets of the 
nineteenth century, for example, Australia and New Zealand, the Swedish government 
did not directly participate in the domestic insurance market by providing insurance 
services through a State-owned insurance corporation. Instead, like in the UK, the 
Swedish government monitored and protected the public interest in the domestic 
insurance market through a system of insurance legislation and regulations that were 
primarily designed to protect consumers against corporate insolvency (Larsson, 1991; 
Lindmark et al., 2005). Therefore, what is according to Browne and Kim (1993) an 
important determinant of early industrialization and economic growth – a State-owned 
insurance company – did not exist in Sweden.  
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century the Swedish banking and 
insurance markets expanded rapidly. For example, the banks increased the volume of 
credit, particularly with regard to increasing the provision of personal and commercial 
savings and credit facilities, issuance of mortgages and the financing of equity stakes 
in new ventures (Nygren, 1983). At the same time, Swedish insurance companies 
entered new markets in private lines of insurance, such as life insurance, and 
expanded their business with the wider commercial sector particularly in property 
insurance lines, like fire and storm damage protection (Bergander, 1967). 
Additionally, some insurance services in Sweden at the time (and still are) were 
provided by customer (policyholder)-owned mutual organizations, particularly in fire 
and life insurance (Hägg, 1998)5,6. Like in the Swedish private savings bank sector, 
                                                 
4 From 1834 to the outbreak of World War I Sweden adopted a fixed exchange rate pegged to a silver 
standard (up to 1855) and a gold standard thereafter (e.g., see Gårdlund, 1947; Heckscher, 1954). 
5 Several reasons are given in the literature to explain the preponderance of customer-owned mutual 
organizations in parts of the financial services sector especially insurance. For example, Pottier and 
Sommer (1997) report that mutual insurers are likely to emerge where underwriting risks are more 
predictable (e.g., as a result of advances in actuarial technology) thus obviating the need for them to 
incur potentially high costs of raising new capital. Pottier and Sommer (1997) also report that by 
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mutual insurance companies were often established in the nineteenth century (and 
before) to serve the financial protection needs of local (particularly rural) 
communities, and in absolute terms, the number of mutual insurers in Sweden soon 
exceeded that of the national insurers. This industry feature exists today where mutual 
insurers comprise roughly 70 percent of the total number of insurance companies in 
the Swedish market (n = 225 companies), but they generate less than 20 percent of 
annual premiums (Swedish Insurance Federation, 2004). However, in the second-half 
of the nineteenth century it was the large (city-based) national joint-stock financial 
services companies, like the Stockholm-based Handelsbank and Skandia companies 
that came to dominate the Swedish financial services sector and its associated 
regulatory system, particularly in ways that blunted foreign competition7. The growth 
of an oligopoly market in the Swedish financial services sector at this time also 
emerged in other European states such as France (e.g., see Hautcoeur, 2004).  
World War I created an export-led economic boom for (neutral) Sweden 
which stimulated development of the financial services sector, including credit, risk 
management services and insurance, particularly in relation to property investment, 
commercial and private mortgages and transportation (Hansson and Jonung, 1997). 
Nevertheless, the post-World War I economic recession led to industry rationalization 
with some corporate amalgamations and exits from the Swedish market (particularly 
by foreign financial companies) (e.g., see Larsson, 1991; Jonung, 1992). However, an 
important feature that characterized the post-World War I financial services sector in 
Sweden was that compared with financial companies in the UK and US that invested 
heavily in stock markets (Scott, 2002), Swedish banks and insurance companies held 
most of their assets in non-liquid assets such as property and low risk securities like 
government bonds (e.g., see Larsson, 1991). Waldenström (2002) also reports that 
high investment taxes during this time provided disincentives for Swedish 
institutional investors (like banks and insurance companies) to invest in equities. Scott 
                                                                                                                                            
merging the customer-owner functions mutual organizations can economize on the agency costs 
incurred in joint-stock companies in maintaining and monitoring the different economic interests of 
policyholders and shareholders. The ability of insurers to use actuarial technology to control and 
accurately price assumed risks could help to explain why to date the process of demutualization has not 
been as common in Sweden’s insurance industry compared with its banking sector (see Lindmark et al., 
2005). 
6 Mutual forms of organization in Sweden date back to the eighteenth century when community risk-
sharing pools were established in cities and rural areas to cover (in the main) fire damage losses and 
widows and orphans pensions (e.g., see Hägg, 1998). 
7 For example, even today only 28 foreign insurers are licensed to operate in Sweden generating only 
about 2-3 percent of total annual premiums (Swedish Insurance Federation, 2004). 
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(2002), for example, suggests that a primary motivation for Anglo-American 
insurance companies shifting to a more equity-centred investment strategy was to 
stabilize cash flows through portfolio diversification. Additionally, the relative 
absence of (bonus-related) participatory rights life insurance policies in Sweden did 
not provide the same stimulus for domestic financial institutions to actively engage in 
portfolio management as it did for their counterparts in the UK and US. The upside 
was that this precautionary investment strategy enabled Swedish banks and insurance 
companies to survive the extremes of the 1920s stock market crash and the 
subsequent economic depression of the 1930s (Petersson, 1987; Larsson, 1991; 
Magnusson, 1997). On the other hand, the lack of equity-based institutional 
investment in Sweden during the inter-war years could have stifled the pace of 
development in the economy as a whole. Hautcoeur’s (2004) analysis suggests that 
for similar institutional and regulatory reasons France also experienced a 
precautionary institutional investment strategy during the inter-war years with adverse 
consequences for new business development and the pace of economic growth. 
The World War II period signalled far-reaching changes in the Swedish 
financial system particularly in terms of the increased demand for consumer credit 
and risk management services (Hansson and Jonung, 1997). For instance, in 1948 new 
insurance regulations were introduced in Sweden to ensure the maintenance of 
adequate reserving and liquidity levels, and also to direct insurance companies’ 
investments into public sector projects and government-sponsored social welfare 
schemes. Post-World War II, the Swedish government also sought to stabilize the 
domestic credit market by controlling bank interest rates and levels of bank lending 
(Jonung, 1992). However, interest rate caps restricted returns on financial services 
companies’ assets that led increasingly to greater direct institutional investment in the 
equities of Swedish and foreign companies in the late 1970s/early 1980s. In the 
1980s, most of the stringent post-World War II regulations relating to the financial 
services sector were relaxed thereby enabling Swedish insurance companies to play a 
greater role in the provision of credit services (e.g., commercial mortgages), social 
insurance (e.g., pensions and private health care) and direct investment in both 
domestic and overseas-based companies than had hitherto been the case. In recent 
years Swedish banks have also formed insurance subsidiaries (bancassurers) to offer 
insurance products and risk management services to the public thus leading to a 
 11
convergence between the banking and insurance sectors of the economy (Lindmark et 
al., 2005). 
 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
In this section of the paper we examine the theoretical linkages between 
banking, insurance and economic growth. 
 
3.1. The Influence of Financial Intermediation on Economic Growth 
3.1.1. Banks 
Several researchers (e.g., Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998; Rousseau and Sylla, 
2005; Sylla, 2002, 2003) have emphasized the historical importance of banking 
market activity to economic growth. For example, Sylla (2003) reports that in the US 
in the nineteenth century banks (both national and foreign) were actively providing 
trade credit and venture capital for new business start-ups. Sandberg (1978, p. 666) 
and Nygren (1983, p. 61) also point out that towards the end of the nineteenth century 
it was common for Swedish banks to issue loans against the shares of both new start-
ups and established companies and to be represented on the boards of publicly listed 
and non-publicly listed companies. Sylla (2003) reports that banks (like insurance 
companies) have comparative advantages over other forms of organization in 
assessing and pricing assumed risks (e.g., credit risk) and diversifying such risks by 
holding balanced portfolios of investments and having (particularly in the case of 
banks) joint-stock corporate structures protected by limited liability. Hägg (1994, 
1997) contends that a supporting system of property rights law and contractual 
enforcement are also prerequisites for efficient and effective financial intermediation, 
and that by the end of the nineteenth century such a legal infrastructure was well 
developed in Sweden. In addition, Sandberg (1978) reports that during the second-
half of the nineteenth century Swedish banks established a network of national 
branches that enabled them to expand their business activities especially in new 
industrial areas. A similar patter of distribution networks further characterized the 
Swedish insurance industry in the second-half of the nineteenth century (Lindmark et 
al, 2005). Swedish banks also financed corporate investments by cooperating with 
each other (e.g., on setting interest rates) and providing large loans on a syndicated 
basis. The raising of equity for the banking sector was also facilitated by the 
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Companies Act 1863 that introduced limited liability that provided those Swedish 
banks that chose to become joint-stock companies to expand and spread their risks 
(e.g., see Sandberg, 1978, p. 663). The stability of the banking system in Sweden was 
further underpinned in the 1890s when the Riksbank became more of a modern 
central bank that acted as ‘lender of the last resort’ and active monitor of domestic 
financial systems (Nygren, 1983). Sandberg (1978, p. 680) further points out that 
from the 1870s Sweden’s commercial banking system was by international standards 
very sophisticated, particularly with regard to encouraging savings and investment in 
new technology, and that these attributes had a significant positive impact on the rate 
of economic growth. Indeed, Sylla (2003, p. 447) reports that a growing body of 
empirical evidence in the financial economics literature (e.g., Wachtel and Rousseau, 
1995; Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998) that supports the view that banks directly 
influence economic growth. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: Other things being equal, the banking market directly influences 
economic growth. 
 
3.1.2. Insurance Companies 
Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) and Kugler and Ofoghui (2005) report that in 
offering risk transfer, indemnification for unexpectedly large losses and financial 
intermediary services, insurance markets have had a significant productive impact 
within economies. For example, insurance can help to promote investment in 
productive assets by providing surety to investors and other contractual claimants 
(e.g., banks) that the value of the investment is protected against unanticipated severe 
losses (such as those arising from fire and flood damage). MacMinn (1987) reports 
that insurance can provide an important post-loss financing function and mitigate 
agency problems, such as the underinvestment incentive, that can occur in 
(particularly highly levered) companies that suffer a large asset-loss8. This leads to 
insurance having positive externalities in terms of employment creation, increased 
economic activity, and business innovation (technology) and risk-taking. Moreover, in 
efficient insurance markets, the setting of actuarially fair insurance prices will 
                                                 
8 The underinvestment problem arises because under limited liability rules shareholders have (a default 
put) option that allows them to choose not to reinvest in fixed assets damaged by severe mishap (e.g., 
due to fire). This is because the economic benefits of reinvestment could be greater for other claimants 
– for example, debtholders that hold fixed claims over the assets as collateral for loans granted. 
Insurance resolves this issue by indemnifying shareholders against the cost of asset reinstatement. 
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compensate for negative externalities such as the moral hazard problems arising from 
excessive risk-taking as a consequence of insurance (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). 
Actuarial fair pricing should also help to facilitate the efficient accumulation of 
productive capital and provide a spur to economic growth (Ward and Zurbruegg, 
2000). In Sweden, however, insurance industry regulation has in the past (for 
example, after the 1948 insurance regulations came into effect) placed limits on the 
rates of premiums that insurance companies can charge for assumed risks in order to 
facilitate the achievement of the State’s wider social welfare objectives. The 
regulation of premium rates could therefore lead to the mis-pricing of assumed risks 
and the inefficient allocation of capital within insurance companies. The trade-off 
between social welfare benefits of premium controls and the (non-Pareto optimal) 
efficiency losses generated from State regulation of the Swedish insurance market 
could have wider macroeconomic ramifications – for example, by reducing funds 
available for institutional investment and limiting insurance companies’ capacity for 
underwriting future business risks (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990). Additionally, 
Butler, Gardner and Gardner (1998) have shown that in the US, workers’ 
compensation insurance and sickness benefits has had significant moral hazard 
consequences as a result of increased absenteeism and produced reduced levels of 
productivity in the economy. These findings could equally apply in Sweden as 
workers’ compensation insurance has been around since 1913 (Larsson, 1991).  
Larsson (1991) also notes that in the inter-war years Swedish insurance 
companies played an important role, in partnership with government in maintaining 
domestic economic stability through, for example, precautionary investment 
management and risk assessment, and direct involvement in underwriting public 
sector projects. Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) add that as major institutional investors, 
insurance companies not only help the efficient allocation of capital in an economy 
but also enhance returns on their investments through active monitoring of managerial 
activities and corporate governance. This reasoning leads us to hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Other things being equal, the insurance market directly influences 
economic growth. 
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3.2. The Influence of Economic Growth on Financial Intermediation 
As noted earlier in section 1, the direction of causality between banking, 
insurance and economic growth can run both ways. That is, financial intermediation 
may not only facilitate economic growth by providing credit facilities, risk transfer, 
loss indemnification, and so on, but conversely, it could be the case that economic 
growth creates the demand for banking and insurance – for example, supplying 
investment funds and protecting accumulated productive capital against unanticipated 
losses (Fohlin, 2002). As Hansson and Jonung (1997) point out, both lines of 
reasoning are plausible theoretically and so empirical analysis is needed to resolve the 
issue. In the Swedish context, Sandberg (1978) contends that in the early/mid-
nineteenth century the domestic system of financial intermediation was relatively 
more sophisticated than the system of industrial production. Consequently, Sandberg 
(1978) argues that financial intermediaries like banks and insurance companies 
stimulated economic growth in the early period of industrialization in Sweden by 
providing, amongst other things, capital for investment and risk protection services. 
With regard to insurance, Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) contend that the risk 
management and financial intermediary benefits of insurance, and their impact on 
economic growth could persist over time, particularly in relatively long-protected 
domestic economies such as Sweden. On the other hand, Rousseau and Wachtel 
(1998) contend that in developed economies financial intermediation may become a 
relatively less important influence on economic growth as financial markets become 
more advanced. Wachtel and Rousseau (1995) and Rousseau and Sylla (2005) provide 
empirical support for this view from their historical analysis of financial systems and 
economic development in Anglo-American countries. They find that in these 
economies there was a stronger relation between financial intermediation and 
economic growth prior to the Great Depression of the 1930s compared with the post-
World War II period when financial systems and capital markets became more 
sophisticated due to, amongst other things, increased global trade and investment. 
In the debate concerning the causal linkage between financial intermediation 
and economic growth, Kindleberger (1982) argues that in the nineteenth century the 
demand for banking (and indeed, insurance) services in Sweden emerged directly 
from the rapid industrialization in major urban centres such as Stockholm, 
Gothenburg, and Malmö. King and Levine (1993) also suggest that economic 
development (that may be prompted by public as well as private sector investment) 
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could stimulate the demand for ancillary services such as banking and insurance. The 
Swedish government has been actively interventionist in the management of the 
national economy in partnership with the private sector since at least the turn of the 
twentieth century (Heckscher, 1954; Hansson and Jonung, 1997; Magnusson, 1997). 
Moreover, Gelderblom and Jonker (2004) observe that to facilitate economic growth 
the demand for consumer and commercial credit has to be met by a ready supply of 
funds (savings). In their capacity as financial intermediaries insurance companies can 
also play an important role in the accumulation and investment of capital in the 
economy (Ward and Zurbruegg, 2000). Therefore, it is plausible that the growth of 
banking and insurance services was stimulated by economic growth throughout our 
period of analysis (1830-1998). That is, the demand for banking and insurance is 
income elastic. Using Swedish economic data from 1861 to 1910 Fisher and Thurman 
(1989) in fact find that that the growth of the banking sector was caused by, not the 
cause of, economic growth. We thus present two alternative test hypotheses: 
 
H3: Other things being equal, economic growth directly influences the 
banking market. 
 
H4: Other things being equal, economic growth directly influences the 
insurance market. 
 
3.3. Conjoint Effects of Banking and Insurance and Economic Growth 
Sylla (2003) reports that financial intermediary systems interact closely in 
modern economies. This suggests that it is the conjoint effects of banking and 
insurance that stimulate economic growth. For example, Grace and Rebello (1993) 
argue that insurance encourages greater corporate bank borrowing by reducing 
companies’ market cost of capital, which in turn influences economic growth by 
stimulating demand for financial services. Assets-based (property) insurance can also 
protect the value of collateral underpinning loans granted from losses due to fire, 
storm damage and so on. This attribute helps to reduce banks’ credit risk exposures  
(and enhance shareholders’ returns) and so promote higher levels of lending than 
would be the case without insurance (e.g., see Zou and Adams, 2006). In addition, 
banks also use deposit insurance to protect their investments against (systematic) 
market risks and liquidity crises arising from unexpected severe loss events (Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983); in fact, in most developed countries banks have used deposit 
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insurance to protect against the risk of such losses since at least the early twentieth 
century (Hooks and Robinson, 2002). This aspect of insurance potentially helps banks 
to alleviate credit risk, increase corporate and private lending, and invest in potentially 
high yielding projects thereby stimulating economic development. Consequently, 
insurance helps to facilitate the supply of bank credit in the economy. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
H5: Other things being equal, the interaction of the banking and 
insurance markets directly influence economic growth. 
 
On the other hand, high levels of economic activity can increase the market 
demand for bank loans to finance corporate growth opportunities and thus drive the 
demand for assets-based insurance cover. Additionally, the level of activity in an 
economy can affect the volume of deposits (investment funds) retained by financial 
intermediaries and thus the degree of institutional investment (Fohlin, 2002). 
Increases in the value of invested assets can also influence the need for banks to 
purchase (more) deposit insurance (Hooks and Robinson, 2002). This implies that:  
 
H6: Other things being equal, economic growth directly influences the 
interaction of banking and insurance markets. 
 
3.4. Other Considerations 
To sum up, the direction of the causal relation between banking, insurance and 
economic growth remains an unresolved empirical issue. For example, using 1961-
1996 data for nine OECD countries Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) found mixed results 
concerning the insurance-economic growth relation. Their causality tests revealed that 
for some countries (e.g., Canada and Japan) there was evidence that insurance market 
growth led to growth in the economy at large; for others (e.g., France) the results 
showed a causal effect from economic growth to insurance market development; and 
for four countries, including the UK and US, no significant results were produced in 
either direction. Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) attribute their findings to country-
specific factors such as the relative state of regulatory development, the degree of 
insurance penetration9 and the cultural propensity to insure versus self-insurance (e.g., 
through personal savings). Kugler and Ofoghi (2005) also provide mixed results using 
                                                 
9 Insurance penetration is defined as the ratio of total annual insurance industry premiums over gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita (e.g., see Swiss Re, 2004). 
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disaggregate (line of insurance) data for the UK’s property-liability insurance industry 
for 1971-2003. Arestis and Demetriades (1997) also report that the strength and 
direction of the relation between economic growth and financial intermediation could 
be cointegrated over time as a result of cyclical changes in the pace of human and 
physical capital development and economic growth, and competition between national 
and international financial services companies. Furthermore, it is possible that for 
certain periods within a long historical time series (as is the case in this study) the 
relation between banking, insurance and economic growth may be stationary and 
difficult to disentangle (Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998).  Indeed, Hautcoeur’s (2002) 
historical analysis of the French life insurance industry (1870-1939) points to 
stagnation in the insurance-economic growth relation due to such factors as 
precautionary insurance company investment strategies, managerial inertia, and 
oligopoly market-induced regulation that promoted the status quo and stifled the pace 
of product-market innovation and wider economic development. On the other hand, 
Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) report that for the same period covered by Hautcoeur 
(2002) Scandinavian insurance markets (like Sweden) commonly used the latest 
(actuarial) technology, and that this helped them to realize operational efficiencies and 
increased profitability, which in turn fostered growth in the insurance sector10. These 
issues will therefore be examined empirically in the remainder of this paper. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
This section describes the research methodology that we employed including 
the description of the data, econometric specifications and definition of the variables. 
 
4.1. Data 
Our data covers the 159 years 1830-1998 and represents the earliest and latest 
years for which complete archival data were available at the time the study was 
carried out. Economic data are the GDP volumes and per capita estimates derived 
from Krantz (2001), which are based on the Swedish Historical National Accounts 
series published in Krantz (1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1991), Pettersson (1987), and Schön 
(1988, 1995). Data on bank loans and mortgages (private and commercial) granted up 
                                                 
10 Sweden has had a professional actuarial body since 1904. The role and responsibilities of Swedish 
actuaries (e.g., in terms of solvency management and financial reporting) has been enshrined in various 
insurance statutes since the passing of the Insurance Act 1903 (Hägg, 1998). 
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to 1860 were collected from the Sveriges Riksbank (1931) archive, after which time 
data were collected from the Swedish Official Statistics (SOS Statistisk Årsbok). 
Swedish savings banks were first established in the 1830s, but the period up to 1856 
is covered by five-yearly benchmarks derived from other Swedish archives (i.e., 
Finanskomitén, 1863, Table 22). These benchmarks were linearly interpolated with 
commercial bank loans as a variation index. Thereafter, the loans were collected from 
the financial services periodical Statistisk Tidskrift until 1913, after which time data 
were obtained from the Swedish Official Statistics Office (SOS Statistisk Årsbok). 
Swedish mortgage banks were established in the 1840s and the periodical Sveriges 
Statistik i sammandrag provided annual data on bank issued mortgages from 1870 
onwards. As the outstanding mortgage value, date of issue and duration (usually 40 
years) and interest rate are included in the1870 records we were able to estimate the 
annual value of bank mortgages issued by Swedish banks from for the 30 years or so 
prior to 1870. Data on annual aggregate (non-life and life) insurance premiums for the 
period 1830 to 1913 were collected from Bergander (1967) supplemented with data 
derived from Wrede (1882), Grip (1992), the Stockholm Stads Brandkontor 
(Almquist 1921) and the Allmänna Änke- och Pupillkassans archives11. From 1913 
onwards all insurance premiums data were collected from the official Swedish 
insurance industry statistics (SOS Enskilda Försäkringsanstalter), supplemented from 
1996 by the Financial Inspectorate (Finansinspektionen) online Swedish business 
reports 
 
 4.2. Specification 
 As in prior studies (e.g., Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Hansson and Jonung, 
1997; Ward and Zurbruegg, 2000; Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel, 2001) we 
construct a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to test for dynamic interactions 
(Granger causality) in a p-dimensional system, defined by: 
ttktkttt DXXXX ε+Φ+Π++Π+Π= −−− ...2211   [1] 
where tX  is a p-dimensional vector of the time series under study, the Π ’s are 
pp× matrices defining the relation between a variable and lags of another. The 
variable Dt is a vector of exogenous variables, in our case enabling estimation of 
                                                 
11 We aggregate non-life and life annual insurance premiums as risk transfer, indemnification and 
financial intermediation are functions common to both life and non-life insurance (see also Ward and 
Zurbruegg, 2000, p. 490). 
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intercept and trend. The Granger (1969) test for causality between the variables 
involves a joint F- or 2χ - test to examine whether a variable, say itX , can explain 
future values of another, say ktjX +, . In this example, the null hypothesis (H0) of no 
Granger causality from itX  to jtX  is represented by stating that the (j,i)’th 
coefficients of  the matrices 1Π , 2Π ,…, kΠ  are all zero.  The concept can also be 
extended to allow for testing if a group of variables Granger causes another group of 
variables (Johansen, 1988). The most general use of the test in this paper will be to 
investigate whether two variables are Granger-causing a third variable. 
If our time series are stationary, this would be a sufficient methodology and 
the equation [1] could be used for testing our hypotheses on Granger causality. We 
can then state our VAR-model in levels and thereby, use our observations directly 
without any transformation. However, like many statistical procedures, tests of 
Granger causality become more complicated when the series are non-stationary in a 
particular sense, namely that they are so called integrated of order d or I(d). In general 
terms, this means that they can be made stationary by differencing them d times. The 
reason for these difficulties is that quantities which otherwise follow the well-known 
t-, F- or 2χ distributions take on other distributions which are more complicated to 
deal with. Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) and subsequently, Toda and Phillips (1993) 
investigated this problem. The latter authors concluded that the distribution of the test 
statistic for Granger causality in level VAR’s relies on information that is difficult to 
obtain from the data. There are three main ways of performing the test: first, we can 
specify a VAR-model in differences and test for Granger causality in changes of the 
variables. In doing this, we ignore any possible long-run relation that might exist 
between variables. A second alternative is to use the levels in the way suggested by 
Toda and Yamamoto (1995). They show that, with a modification of the model 
selection procedure, a VAR-model in levels can be used to test for Granger causality 
and the test-statistics will behave as in the stationary case. The modification consists 
of first choosing the lag-length using some information criterion (in our case we use 
both the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian criterion 
(SBC)), and then add the maximal possible order of integration, maxd , to this lag 
length. The test is then a Wald test where a restriction is imposed on the first 
maxdlaglength − lags. This is a robust test in that it does not assume a priori 
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knowledge of the order of integration and cointegration of the process. The third 
approach, which is applicable when the variables are cointegrated, is to base the 
Granger causality test on the error correction (ECM) form of [1]. However, Toda and 
Phillips (1993) study this procedure and conclude that the distribution of the test 
statistic depends on nuisance parameters that have to be estimated from the data. We 
therefore choose to work with the robust method proposed by Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995) even though we loose test power compared with the case when the order of 
integration and cointegration are assumed known. 
Cointegration analysis, however, can yield interesting results in other respects. 
The special case of cointegration that we are using here means that there exist linear 
combinations of I(1)-variables that are I(0). In the case when r such linear 
combinations exist, the ECM of [1] can be written as: 
ttit
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. Cointegration is present in the system when 
the matrix Π  can be decomposed into the product of two rp× matrices α  and β  
(determining the stationary linear combinations) such that βα ′=Π (see e.g. Engle 
and Granger, 1987). Our model now becomes: 
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1    [3] 
Johansen (1991, 1995) provides a unified approach to analyze cointegration 
within VAR models. Amongst other things, procedures for determination of r and 
estimation of the parameters in the model are given, while the elements of the vector 
tXβ ′  are the stationary linear combinations, which can be interpreted as in 
equilibrium. However, in order for cointegration to be revealing, the original variables 
in the system must be integrated. The stationarity of the variables is therefore 
investigated by means of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, which uses an 
autoregressive model, including intercept and trend to accommodate for these features 
in the data. The regression used in this test is: 
tkt
p
k
tt vxtxx +Δ+++=Δ −
−
=
− ∑1
1
101 βδδα    [4]  
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where tv  is a white noise process and the null hypothesis (H0) of non-stationarity, a so 
called unit root, is 0=α . Rejection of the H0 means that there is statistical evidence 
that the time series is stationary. 
Whether we are using VAR models in levels or differences, we need to 
predetermine the lag-length before commencing with the analysis (Arestis et al., 
2001). Since no particular prior reasoning guides us here we let the AIC and SBC 
determine the lag length. Roughly, these methods uses the likelihood function (where 
a large value implies a good model) and penalizes it with a function that increases 
with the number of parameters. This means that we are weighting the two conflicting 
goals of having a good fit to the data and having few parameters (the so-called 
principle of parsimony). The way we are using these information criteria is that we let 
them give us ideas of the lag length, after which we test, jointly, for autocorrelation in 
the residual series. The latter is done using a multivariate Lagrange multiplier (LM) 
test (e.g., see Arestis et al., 2001). 
 
4.3. Variables 
First, our key variables are defined as follows: 
Economic Growth (xt) (ECON): We use the log of annual per capita income 
growth in the rate of real GDP to measure economic growth.  
Bank Credit (BANK): We use data for total (central, commercial and savings) 
real bank lending to the non-bank public on a per capita basis to represent this 
variable. The implicit GDP deflator was also used to convert prices to real terms.  
Insurance Penetration (INS): This variable is measured as the real annual 
value of total annual premiums (life and non-life insurance) per capita. In deriving 
real values, current premiums are again deflated with the implicit GDP deflator. 
Furthermore, due to the long time period covered by our study (159 years) we 
divided the time series into three distinct sub-periods, governed by a combination of 
historical institutional changes (e.g., regulatory), the need for sufficient period length 
for analysis and the results derived from the Granger causality tests. The sub-periods 
of analysis were: the early development period 1830-1888; 1889-1948, including the 
inter-war/war years up to the insurance regulation of 1948; and the post-World War II 
period 1949-1998. 
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5. Empirical Results 
In this section of the paper we outline and discuss the empirical results of our 
study. 
 
5.1. Preliminary Tests 
As can be seen from Figure 1, there are clearly upward trends in the 
logarithms of the three variables (ECON, BANK and INS) during the observed 
historical period, and these have to be accounted for in the analysis in order to get 
correct inference on the matters that interest us. We thus choose to approximate them 
by linear trends, which suggest that the three variables are, in some sense, moving 
together over time. However, whether this is due to a deterministic trend or to 
cointegration is a question that is formally analyzed below. Furthermore, the question 
of Granger causality, that is whether events in a variable are systematically preceding 
events in another, is not easy to get an idea of visually. The issue of Granger causality 
is therefore examined later in this section of the paper.  
 
Figure 1: Time plots of the logarithms of the variables BANK, ECON and INS. 
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As in prior research (e.g., Ward and Zurbruegg, 2000) we conducted 
preliminary tests on our historical time series data set to determine the order of 
integration and lag length. First, we carried out unit root tests on the data to examine 
for non-stationarity in the historical time series using the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test for the full sample (see Table 1). On the basis of the graph above, both the 
intercept and trend were included in the tests. The SBC was used to determine the lag 
length. There is no evidence for stationarity of the time series. In the sequel, we 
assume that all three variables are I(1). 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The next step is the lag length determination of ECM VAR-models in levels for the 
full period. Table 2, which presents the AIC and SBC for lag length determination in 
VAR models, shows that the criteria give one and three lags respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The null hypothesis is that all autocorrelations and cross autocorrelations of order Lag 
or less are zero. Accordingly, to the test statistics and p-values of the multivariate LM 
test of autocorrelation there is no evidence of autocorrelation in VAR (4) model of 
first differences. The choice was then based on the results of the autocorrelation tests 
of residuals, reported in table 3, showing the test statistics and p-values of the 
multivariate LM test of autocorrelation. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Accordingly, the VAR (4) in levels is an appropriate point of departure for further 
testing of both Granger causality and the long-term relation between the variables.  
 
5.2. Granger Causality over the Full Period: 1830-1998 
As causality in the historical time series could be modelled as a VAR (4) in 
levels, we investigated causality between our key variables using the Granger 
causality Wald test described in Toda and Yamamoto (1995). Although it is unlikely 
that the same causality has prevailed throughout the entire time series, we 
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nevertheless started with a test for the whole historical time period (159 years). Table 
4 gives the Granger Causality Wald Test Statistics for the entire historical time series 
(1830-1998). The tests also include pairwise Granger causality tests among the 
variables. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
From Table 4 (tests 1 and 2) it is evident that for the 159 years of analysis as a 
whole ECON is only singularly Granger-caused by BANK at the 1% confidence level 
(2-tail), suggesting that, consistent with H1, increased levels of bank credit drives 
economic development. In addition, BANK is Granger-causing INS (Table 4, test 5 at 
p≤ 0.01, 2-tail) with ECON in association with BANK also having a significant 
influence the growth of insurance markets (Table 4, test 6 at p≤ 0.01, 2-tail). These 
observations indicate that the development of the banking sector and economic 
growth together influence the demand for insurance probably as insurance provides 
surety for unanticipated asset losses after loans have been granted. Interestingly, this 
phenomenon has also been reported in contemporary emerging economies such as 
China (e.g., see Zou and Adams, 2006). However, as Jonung (1992) reports it is 
important to determine structural shifts in Granger causation in historical time-series 
data by examining the relation between the variables of interest in different sub-
periods within the time series (see section 4.3). We thus conduct and report the results 
of these tests in 5.3 to 5.5 below. 
 
5.3. Granger Causality over the Sub-Period: 1830-1888 
 
This sub-period covers the early industrialization phase of Sweden’s economic 
development from 1830 to 1888 at which point high levels of claims (particularly in 
relation to fire damage) led Swedish insurance companies to report substantial losses 
and increase rates of premiums. It also prompted a wave of restructuring 
(consolidation) in the Swedish financial services sector and the introduction of new 
banking and insurance market regulations (Larsson, 1991; Jonung, 1992).  The 
Granger Causality Wald tests covering the sub-period 1830-1888 are exhibited in 
Table 5.  
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 (test 2) suggests that BANK influenced ECON in Sweden in the early 
period of industrialization (p≤ 0.10, 2-tail) as predicted by H1, while analyzed 
separately, INS responded positively to both growth in banking and the economy. 
This finding is consistent with Hansson and Jonung’s (1997) historical analysis of the 
link between banking and financial development in nineteenth century Sweden and 
suggests that assets-based insurance coverage lagged behind the growth of bank credit 
in the promotion of economic development in the early years of industrialization and 
urban growth. The phenomenon of insurance lagging behind bank lending has also 
been witnessed in contemporary developing markets (such as China) (e.g., see Zou 
and Adams, 2006) and arises for various reasons. For example, the potential for large 
short-term investment yields from bank lending in periods of rapid economic growth 
can often take precedence over careful risk underwriting and loss mitigation. The 
result of tests 5 and 6 of Table 5 indicate that for the years 1830-1888 the growth of 
banking services and economic activity Granger-causes a corresponding increase in 
the demand for insurance (at p≤ 0.10, 2-tail), suggesting that eventually the risk 
protection qualities of insurance becomes increasing important in both bank-based 
and corporate decision-making as the economy develops and becomes more complex 
and uncertain. Therefore, it appears that the insurance market initially lagged behind 
the banking sector in stimulating economic growth but then became more important 
as it became an integral part of the lending criteria of Swedish banks in the early 
period of rapid industrialization of the nineteenth century. 
 
5.4. Granger Causality over the Sub-Period: 1889-1948 
 
This sub-period covers the late nineteenth century industrialization 
consolidation phase of development through to the turbulent World War I and II 
period, and the depression years in the inter-war period. The Granger causality 
statistics are shown in Table 6 and again, the only statistically significant results (both 
2-tail) are that BANK is Granger-causing INS (Table 6, test 5, p≤ 0.05) and that 
BANK in association with buoyant economic growth also influences INS (Table 6, 
test 6, p≤ 0.10). These results suggest that demand in the insurance market is 
dependent on the level of banking activity and the state of the economy during this 
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period. This result is not surprising as in periods of recession (such as the inter-war 
years) insurance is likely to be particularly price and income elastic. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Compared with the first sub-period, this phase of Sweden’s economic 
development (despite the existence of a more mature financial system) appears to 
indicate important changes in the way the economy works. This is because the causal 
relation between BANK, INS and ECON revealed in tests 2 and 3 of Table 6 (and 
previously significant at the 10 % level) are now insignificant (contrary to H1 and H2). 
This may simply be a reflection of the global economic turmoil during the inter-war 
years, which makes the sub-period particularly difficult to analyze with certainty. On 
the other hand, we cannot rule out the possibility that there are important structural 
changes in the economy as it matures over time as the evidence suggests that the 
financial services sector at this stage may no longer be a prime mover of national 
economic growth. There are two main possible (non-mutually exclusive) explanations 
for this observation. First the insignificant relation between BANK, INS and ECON 
during this sub-period could be due to regulatory changes affecting the banking and 
insurance markets. For example, more stringent solvency-based regulations (e.g., the 
1903 Insurance Act) could have meant that financial intermediaries had less capital to 
invest in prospective positive net present value projects and that this had a detrimental 
effect on economic growth (e.g., see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Second, financial 
intermediaries may also have had to retain high levels of liquid assets (e.g., cash) and 
strictly ration investment in emerging growth opportunities during the inter-war years 
because Sweden did not have a large (deep) and active domestic stock market (like 
the UK and US) (e.g., see Waldenström, 2002). In other words, the lack of active 
equity trading in Sweden could have contributed to a lack of liquidity in the economy 
thus stifling the impact of financial services companies on economic growth. Indeed, 
prior research (e.g., Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Arestis et al., 2001; Rousseau and 
Sylla, 2005) suggests that well-developed financial markets are vitally important for 
efficient and effective financial intermediation and economic development. 
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5.5. Granger Causality over the Sub-Period: 1949-1998 
 
The third sub-period covers the high economic growth years after World War 
II up to the present day. The Granger causality results are presented in Table 7.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Table 7, test 5 shows that BANK continues to influence INS (p≤ 0.05, 2-tail), 
and that the demand for insurance is also influenced by the combined effect of BANK 
and ECON, as reported in Table 7, test 6 (p≤ 0.01, 2-tail). Thus, there has been a 
reversion in the causal relation between banking in growth, from the nineteenth 
century when banking was causing economic growth, to a situation now where bank 
services appear to be demand driven through changes in average levels of per capita 
income. While INS does not Granger-cause BANK (Table 7, test 8), it does 
significantly influence BANK together with ECON (Table 7, test 9) at the 1% level of 
confidence (2-tail). This result suggests that during the turbulent post-World War II 
period the insurance market played an increasing important role in the Swedish 
economy in terms of its role in alleviating bank-related credit risks through loan 
protection and deposit insurance. Table 7, test 5, however, suggests that within the 
financial sector, it is banking that is in the main driving the growth in insurance (p≤ 
0.05, 2-tail). That is, post-World War II growth in the demand for banking products, 
such as mortgages (e.g., to finance private home ownership) and other loan-based 
products has simultaneously increased the public demand for assets-based insurance 
protection such as property and life insurance. Since the early 1970s many 
Scandinavian financial services companies began to sell insurance products with 
significant savings components (e.g., investment-linked life insurance and pensions) 
(Lindmark et al., 2005). In addition, as a result of regulatory changes many banks 
began to offer their customers insurance products either directly through 
bancassurance subsidiaries or through partnerships with established insurance 
companies (e.g., see Knutsen, 1999)12. Therefore, product-market shifts and 
                                                 
12 Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) note that in some European insurance markets (e.g., France) major 
changes in the regulatory environment (e.g., due to EU harmonization requirements) and a movement 
away from State provision in health and life insurance could cause changes in the economic growth-
relation. We therefore split our post World War II sample into two further sub-periods covering the 
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regulatory changes (deregulation) can help to explain the conjoint relation between 
ECON, INS and BANK during this latest period of analysis. Ward and Zurbruegg 
(2000) also note that short and long run dynamics in the insurance-economic growth 
relation could be explained by the degree of insurance penetration (i.e., the proportion 
of premiums written per capita) in a country. Swiss Re (2004) reports that amongst 
European countries Sweden is currently ranked twelfth in terms of aggregate 
insurance penetration and that the rate of change in insurance penetration has 
remained relatively stable since the end of World War II. This suggests that in 
Sweden the consumer demand for insurance is potentially buoyant particularly in 
periods of real economic growth and that structural economic shifts influence the 
economic growth-insurance relation. In fact, over the period 1961 to 1996 Ward and 
Zurbruegg (2000) find statistically significant Granger-causation between economic 
growth and insurance in European countries such as Italy that have relatively low 
levels of insurance penetration, while countries like the UK that have high insurance 
penetration do not exhibit such a causal relation. Now that Granger causality of the 
levels is studied we turn to the question what this relationship might look like in the 
long run. 
 
5.6. The Long-Run Relation  
The long-run relation in the historical time series 1830-1998 can be further 
tested using the Johansen (1992) Cointegration Rank Trace Test. In this test, the 
cointegrating equations are assumed to have an intercept, but not a trend; we find 
three lagged first differences and so the H0 that the number of cointegrated equations 
is larger than r can be rejected. The results are presented in table 8 below.  
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
In table 8, we find that the three variables are cointegrated over the full period and 
that one statistically significant long-run relation is reported at the 5% level (2-tail). 
We interpret this result as indicating that economic growth and financial 
intermediation through banking and insurance markets follows a common path. The 
interdependency between the variables indicates that the financial services sector in 
                                                                                                                                            
years before and after the mid-1960s when changes in consumer preferences for investment insurance 
products first emerged in Sweden (e.g., Larsson, 1991). However, this procedure did not change the 
Granger causality and so in the interests of brevity the results are not reported here. 
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Sweden is closely related to economic growth and vice versa.  Turning the estimated 
cointegrating equation, based on an ECM-VAR model assuming three lags of the 
differences, we find further support for the interaction between the variables of 
interest. Table 9 gives the estimated cointegrating vector equations based on the ECM 
model (which assumes three lags of differences). 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
 
The coefficients reported in Table 9 are defining the cointegrating vector, where INS 
is the normalizing variable. From the results, the stationary relation between the 
variables can be written as: ECONINSBANK 04.0.076.039.3 ++−+−  where the 
coefficients can be interpreted as reflecting an equilibrium relation between the 
variables.  To check the model, a joint test of autocorrelation was carried out and the 
results are reported in Table 10. 
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
 
Table 10 presents the test statistics and p-values of the multivariate LM test of 
autocorrelation, calculated with a small sample correction. The H0 is that all 
autocorrelations and cross autocorrelations of order lag or less are zero such that no 
significant autocorrelation remains in residuals. On basis of the results reported in 
Table 10 we therefore conclude that a long-run stationary relation between financial 
services and economic growth exists in our historical time series.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Our study examines empirically the dynamic historical relation between 
banking, insurance and economic growth and insurance in Sweden using a unique 
time-series data set for the period 1830 to 1998. The period of analysis covers the 
early years of mass industrialization to the present day and focuses on the overall 
time-series and three major sub-periods for which sufficient observations were 
available in order for us to conduct analysis. Our study advances the literature 
regarding the importance of financial intermediation and economic growth by 
focusing on a single country – Sweden. This enables us to control for potentially 
 30
confounding effects that can arise in cross-section country studies due to such factors 
as differences in regulatory history and patterns of economic development.  
Our results indicate that the development of banking, but not insurance, 
preceded economic growth in Sweden during the nineteenth century, while Granger 
causality was reversed in the twentieth century. We also find that the development of 
bank lending in the nineteenth century increased the demand for insurance as well as 
promoting economic growth. In later periods, the development of insurance fosters 
demand for banking services but only in times of economic prosperity. For the entire 
period of our analysis, we find that banking is the predominant influence on both 
economic growth and the demand for insurance. In contrast, the insurance market 
appears to be driven more by the pace of growth in the economy rather than leading 
economic development. Therefore, we conclude that financial intermediation, 
particularly banking, is an important prerequisite for stimulating economic 
development and argue that our results could have important policy implications for 
contemporary emerging economies (such as China) that are developing their financial 
and legal infrastructures. We believe that our study provides a basis for further time-
series econometric research of the historical and contemporary role of banking and 
insurance in economic development in other jurisdictions. 
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics 1830-1998 
 
This table presents the Augmented Dicker-Fuller test (tau) statistics for stationarity in the historical 
time series (1830-1998). 
 
 
Variable Tau p-value Lags used 
ECON -2.552 0.303 0 
INS -2.002 0.595 2 
BANK -2.718 0.231 1 
 
Notes: 
1. ECON is the log of annual per capita growth in the rate of real GDP to measure economic growth; 
INS is the real annual value of total annual premiums (life and non-life insurance) per capita; BANK is 
the total (central, commercial and savings) real bank lending to the non-bank public on a per capita 
basis. 
2. p-values are not significant at conventional levels (p≤0.10 or less) indicating non-stationarity in the 
historical time series. 
 
 
Table 2: Lag length determination of VAR-model in levels 1830-1998 
 
This table presents the Akaike and Schwarz Bayesian criteria for lag length determination in VAR-
models for the historical time series (1830-1998). 
 
 
p AIC SBC 
1 -7.160 -6.937 
2 -7.352 -6.959 
3 -7.395 -6.832 
4 -7.424 -6.690 
5 -7.361 -6.454 
 
 
 
Table 3: Joint test of autocorrelation in the VAR (4)-model in levels 
 
The table presents the test statistics and p-values of the multivariate LM test of autocorrelation. The 
null hypothesis is that all autocorrelations and cross autocorrelations of order Lag or less are zero. 
 
Lag Test statistic p-value 
12 6.936 0.644 
24 4.158 0.901 
36 3.586 0.937 
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Table 4: Granger Causality Wald Test Statistics 1830-1998 
 
This table shows the Granger Causality Wald Test Statistics for the entire historical time series (1830-
1998). The tests also include pair-wise Granger causality tests among the variables. 
 
 
Test Test statistic df p-value 
1. INS=> ECON 4.158 4 0.385 
2. BANK=> ECON 13.131 4 0.011*** 
3. INS, BANK=> ECON 17.480 8 0.026** 
4. ECON=>INS 8.180 4 0.085* 
5. BANK=>INS 33.118 4 0.000*** 
6. BANK, ECON=>INS 38.580 8 0.000*** 
7. ECON=>BANK 3.480 4 0.481 
8. INS=>BANK 8.155 4 0.086* 
9. INS, ECON=>BANK 11.402 8 0.180 
 
Note: Χ2 critical values are at the 0.10 level.  Wald test statistics marked * are statistically significant at 
p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05 and *** p≤ 0.01 or less (2-tail). 
 
 
 
Table 5: Granger Causality Wald Test Statistics 1830-1888 
 
This table shows the Granger Causality Wald Test Statistics for the entire historical time series (1830-
1888). The tests also include pair-wise Granger causality tests among the key variables. 
 
 
Test Test statistic df p-value 
1. INS=> ECON 5.411 4 0.248 
 2. BANK=> ECON 9.184  4 0.057* 
3. INS, BANK=> ECON 13.484 8 0.096* 
4. ECON=>INS 9.293 4 0.054** 
5. BANK=>INS 8.057 4 0.090* 
6. BANK, ECON=>INS 14.686 8 0.066* 
7. ECON=>BANK 0.519 4 0.972 
8. INS=>BANK 5.105 4 0.277 
9. INS, ECON=>BANK 6.104 8 0.636 
 
Note: Χ2 critical values are at the 0.10 level.  Wald test statistics marked * are statistically significant at  
p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05 and *** p≤ 0.01 or less (2-tail). 
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Table 6: Granger Causality Wald Test Statistics 1889-1948. 
 
This table shows the Granger Causality Wald Test Statistics for the entire historical time series (1889-
1948). The tests also include pair-wise Granger causality tests among the variables.  
 
 
 
Test Test statistic df p-value 
1. INS=> ECON 0.668 4 0.955 
 2. BANK=> ECON 3.910 4 0.419 
3. INS, BANK=> ECON 6.348 8 0.601 
4. ECON=>INS 4.526 4 0.340 
5. BANK=>INS 9.958 4 0.041** 
6. BANK, ECON=>INS 14.486 8 0.070* 
7. ECON=>BANK 4.415 4 0.353 
8. INS=>BANK 3.613 4 0.461 
9. INS, ECON=>BANK 7.153 8 0.520 
  
Note: Χ2 critical values are at the 0.10 level.  Wald test statistics marked * are statistically significant at 
p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05 and *** p≤ 0.01 or less (all 2-tail). 
 
 
 
Table 7: Granger Causality Wald Test Statistics 1949-1998 
 
This table shows the Granger Causality Wald Test Statistics for the entire historical time series (1889-
1948). The tests also include pair-wise Granger causality tests among the variables. 
 
 
 
Test Test statistic df p-value 
1. INS=> ECON 7.347 4 0.119 
 2. BANK=> ECON 9.440 4 0.510 
3. INS, BANK=> ECON 14.623 8 0.067* 
4. ECON=>INS 6.561 4 0.161 
5. BANK=>INS 9.401 4 0.052** 
6. BANK, ECON=>INS 19.319 8 0.013*** 
7. ECON=>BANK 15.913 4 0.003*** 
8. INS=>BANK 4.129 4 0.389 
9. INS, ECON=>BANK 20.168 8 0.010*** 
 
Note: Χ2 critical values are at the 0.10 level.  Wald test statistics marked * are statistically significant at  
p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05 and *** p≤ 0.01 or less (all 2-tail). 
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Table 8: Johansen’s Cointegration Rank Trace Test Statistics 1830-1998 
 
This table shows the results of the Johansen Cointegration Rank Trace Test in the entire historical time 
series (1830-1998). The cointegrating equations are assumed to have an intercept but not a trend and 
the number of lagged first differences in the ECM was three. The alternative hypothesis is that the 
number of cointegrating equations is larger than r. 
 
Rank at most Trace statistic p-value 
r=0 30.196 0.045** 
r=1 9.745 0.301 
r=2 0.392 0.532 
 
Note: t-values marked ** are statistically significant at p≤ 0.05 (2-tail). 
 
 
Table 9: Estimated Cointegrating Vector from the ECM-VAR (4) Model 
 
This table shows the estimated cointegrating equation, based on a ECM model assuming three lags of 
the differences. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Constant -3.328 0.000*** 
BANK 1.000 0.000*** 
INS -0.761 -14.937 
ECON 0.042 0.391 
 
Note: t-values marked *** are statistically significant at p≤ 0.01 (2-tail). 
 
 
Table 10: Joint Test of Autocorrelation in the ECM-VAR (4) Model 
 
The table presents the test statistics and p-values of the multivariate LM test of autocorrelation, 
calculated with a small sample correction. The null hypothesis is that all autocorrelations and cross 
autocorrelations of order lag or less are zero. 
 
 
Lag Test statistic p-value 
12 9.572 0.386 
24 4.988 0.835 
36 3.547 0.939 
 
 
